BREAKING STORY:Morgan Stanley $3.2 Billion RMBS Settlement. READ FULL TEXT AGREEMENTS

February 11, 2016

On February 11, 2016, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") published a Press Release: "Morgan Stanley Agrees to Pay $2.6 Billion Penalty in Connection with Its Sale of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities" In addition to the DOJ settlement, Morgan Stanley entered into settlements with the states of New York and Illinois for $550 million and $22.5 million, respectively. In pertinent part, the DOJ Press Release states"

The Justice Department today announced that Morgan Stanley will pay a $2.6 billion penalty to resolve claims related to Morgan Stanley's marketing, sale and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).  This settlement constitutes the largest component of the set of resolutions with Morgan Stanley entered by members of the RMBS Working Group, which have totaled approximately $5 billion.  As part of the agreement, Morgan Stanley acknowledged in writing that it failed to disclose critical information to prospective investors about the quality of the mortgage loans underlying its RMBS and about its due diligence practices.  Investors, including federally insured financial institutions, suffered billions of dollars in losses from investing in RMBS issued by Morgan Stanley in 2006 and 2007. 

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As acknowledged by Morgan Stanley in a detailed statement of facts that is a part of this agreement (and is quoted below), the company made representations to prospective investors about the characteristics of the subprime mortgage loans underlying its RMBS - representations with which it did not comply:


  • In particular, Morgan Stanley told investors that it did not securitize underwater loans (loans that exceeded the value of the property).  However, Morgan Stanley did not disclose to investors that in April 2006 it had expanded its "risk tolerance" in evaluating loans in order to purchase and securitize "everything possible."  As Morgan Stanley's manager of valuation due diligence told an employee in 2006, "please do not mention the 'slightly higher risk tolerance' in these communications.  We are running under the radar and do not want to document these types of things."  As a result, Morgan Stanley ignored information - including broker's price opinions (BPOs), which are estimates of a property's value from an independent real estate broker - indicating that thousands of securitized loans were underwater, with combined-loan-to-value ratios over 100 percent.  From January 2006 through mid-2007, Morgan Stanley acknowledged that "Morgan Stanley securitized nearly 9,000 loans with BPO values resulting in [combined loan to value] ratios over 100 percent." 
  • Morgan Stanley also told investors that it did not securitize loans that failed to meet originators' guidelines unless those loans had compensating factors.  Morgan Stanley's offering documents "represented that '[the mortgage loans originated or acquired by [the originator] were done so in accordance with the underwriting guidelines established by [the originator]' but that 'on a case-by-case-basis, exceptions to the [underwriting guidelines] are made where compensating factors exist.'"  Morgan Stanley has now acknowledged, however, that "Morgan Stanley did not disclose to securitization investors that employees of Morgan Stanley received information that, in certain instances, loans that did not comply with underwriting guidelines and lacked adequate compensating factors . . . were included in the RMBS sold and marketed to investors."  So, in fact, "Morgan Stanley . . . securitized certain loans that neither comported with the originators' underwriting guidelines nor had adequate compensating factors."
  • Likewise, "Morgan Stanley also prepared presentation materials . . . that it used in discussions with potential investors that described the due diligence process for reviewing pools of loans prior to securitization," but "certain of Morgan Stanley's actual due diligence practices did not conform to the description of the process set forth" in those materials. 
  • For example, Morgan Stanley obtained BPOs for a percentage of loans in a pool.  Morgan Stanley stated in these presentation materials that it excluded any loan with a BPO value exhibiting an "unacceptable negative variance from the original appraisal," when in fact "Morgan Stanley never rejected a loan based solely on the BPO results." 
  • Through these undisclosed practices, Morgan Stanley increased the percentage of mortgage loans it purchased for its RMBS, notwithstanding its awareness about "deteriorating appraisal quality" and "sloppy underwriting" by the sellers of these loans.  The bank has now acknowledged that "Morgan Stanley was aware of problematic lending practices of the subprime originators from which it purchased mortgage loans."  However, it "did not increase its credit-and-compliance due diligence samples, in part, because it did not want to harm its relationship with its largest subprime originators." Indeed, Morgan Stanley's manager of credit-and-compliance due diligence was admonished to "stop fighting and begin recognizing the point that we need monthly volume from our biggest trading partners and that . . . the client [an originator] does not have to sell to Morgan Stanley."  . . .

Also on February 11, 2016, the New York State Attorney General  ("NYAG") issued a Press Release: "A.G. Schneiderman-Led State & Federal Working Group Announces $3.2 Billion Settlement With Morgan Stanley: 
Settlement Includes $550 Million For New York, Including Millions To Help New Yorkers Avoid Foreclosure And Rebuild Their Communities; Significant Resources Dedicated To Transforming Code Enforcement Systems And Combating Proliferation Of Zombie Homes / 
Settlement Addresses Misconduct That Contributed To The 2008 Financial Crisis / 


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