Last year, Michael Lewis published "Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt" and literally set Wall Street on edge with his thesis that high-frequency trading ("HFT") was ruining the markets by providing unfair advantages to its practitioners at the expense of investors who were relying upon the relatively snail-paced movement of non-HFT data. Lewis's book prompted a number of lawsuits against stock exchanges and dark pools where HFT was purportedly harming investors.
One highly publicized lawsuit became a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") that wound up before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY"). The defendants in the MDL were Barclays PLC, Barclays Capital, Inc, BATS Global Markets, Inc., Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., Direct Edge ECN,LLC, NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc, New York Stock Exchange, LLC, and NYSE Arca.
On August 26, 2015, Judge Jesse Furman published his 51-page Opinion and Order in In Re: Barclays Liquidity Cross and High Frequency Trading Litigation (Opinion and Order, SDNY, 14-md-02589, August 25, 2015). The BrokeAndBroker.com Blog presents this important ruling in FULL-TEXT.
Bill Singer's Comment: Personally, I do not "like" Furman's decision; on the other hand, there are many things in life I do not like and that is not and should not be the acid test when it comes to the serious business of our court system. To Furman's credit, he has crafted an impressive Opinion replete with detailed background content and a patient effort to place the issues and rulings within the appropriate context. Regardless of this decision's fate on appeal, the judge is to be credited for a compelling intellectual exercise in drafting his Opinion in a manner that meticulously presents the issues, the disputes, and his rationale.
Although this federal opinion constitutes a victory for Barclays, that company still faces a pending New York State lawsuit:
For a prescient and excellent discussion of HFT, watch this 2013 video featuring the insights of market pundit Shah Gilani:
- Side Bar: Are human beings obsolete on Wall Street? (February 7, 2013)
The Claims
As more fully explained in the Opinion and Order, there were two baskets of claims: one against the exchanges and the other against Barclays. As explained by Judge Furman [Ed: footnote omitted]:
THE SDNY PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST
THE EXCHANGES
The SDNY Plaintiffs contend that
the Exchanges violated the Exchange Act by engaging in a manipulative scheme in
which they enabled HFT firms to exploit ordinary investors trading on the
Exchanges in return for which the HFT firms directed their considerable trading
activity to the Exchanges. (SDNY Pls.' Mem. 7-8). The essence of the alleged
scheme is as follows. Motivated by the need to increase trading volume, and
therefore revenue, and recognizing that the HFT firms represented a large - and
growing - share of total trading volume, the Exchanges began "catering" their
business operations to the needs of the HFT firms. (Id. at 6-7). Specifically,
they began offering products, such as proprietary feeds and co-location, whose
primary value was to shave minute fractions of a second off the time it takes
to receive and respond to information from the Exchanges. (Id. at 8-10). Such
services are valuable only to HFT firms, as only they stand to profit from very
small decreases in the time it takes to respond to information regarding
activity on the Exchanges; in any case, the Exchanges priced the services at
such "exorbitantly high" rates that they were worthwhile only for HFT firms and
thus "de facto" limited to those firms. (Id. at 8-10, 34). In addition,
Plaintiffs contend that the Exchanges worked with HFT firms to design order
types that would allow the traders to further exploit their speed advantage
over ordinary investors. (Id. at 10-11). Making matters worse, the Exchanges
either did not disclose many of these order types to ordinary investors or
marketed them exclusively to HFT firms, so that the ordinary investors were
unaware of their existence. (See id. at 11-12). Case 1:14-md-02589-JMF Document
50 Filed 08/26/15 Page 12 of 51 13
Through these actions, the
Exchanges enabled the HFT firms to amass a significant speed advantage over
ordinary investors and to employ trading strategies that exploited that speed
advantage to the detriment of ordinary investors. The SAC details the various
strategies that HFT firms used to exploit Plaintiffs as a result of this
scheme. The specifics of those strategies are not relevant here. Instead, it
suffices to say that each of the strategies depended on the HFT firms' ability
to recognize Plaintiffs' trading behavior and, in a fraction of a second, react
to that behavior in a manner that permitted the HFT firms to trade ahead of
Plaintiffs, thereby making a small profit and causing Plaintiffs to trade at
less favorable prices than they would have otherwise. (SAC ¶¶ 237-251). In
enabling the HFT firms to execute those strategies, the SDNY Plaintiffs allege,
the Exchanges' actions "rigged the[] markets in favor of HFT firms." (SDNY
Pls.' Mem. 7)
Pages 12 - 13 of the Opinion and Order
A. The SDNY Plaintiffs' Claims
Against Barclays
The SDNY Plaintiffs contend that
Barclays perpetrated a manipulative or fraudulent scheme to exploit ordinary
investors trading in its dark pool. (SDNY Pls.' Mem. 68-69). The alleged scheme
consisted of two broad components. First, Barclays allegedly disclosed to HFT firms
important, otherwise non-public information regarding transactions in the dark
pool. For example, it provided at least some HFT firms with the "logic" of the
servers operating the dark pool, which enabled those firms to refine their
aggressive trading strategies. (SAC ¶ 278; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 62). Second,
Barclays either failed to establish or actively undermined various protections
for ordinary investors using its dark pool. For example, Barclays allegedly overrode
its Liquidity Profiling product - so that certain HFT firms would appear less aggressive
and, therefore, would not be blocked by investors that sought to block
aggressive firms from trading against them in the dark pool. (SDNY Pls.' Mem.
14; SAC ¶ 277). Similarly, the SDNY Plaintiffs allege that Barclays provided
services - including co-location7 - that
could be used effectively only by HFT firms. (SDNY Pls.' Mem. 71; SAC ¶ 278).
Despite taking those actions to benefit the HFT firms - thereby enabling them
to exploit ordinary investors - Barclays nevertheless represented that its dark
pool was safe and that the SDNY Plaintiffs were not at risk of being exploited
by HFT firms. (Id. ¶¶ 269-74). As a result of these actions, the SDNY
Plaintiffs allegedly traded on worse terms in the dark pool than they would have
in a "fair and unmanipulated market." (SDNY Pls.' Mem. 14; SAC ¶ 279).
These allegations fail to state a claim for at least two independent reasons. First, as they did with respect to the Exchanges, the SNDY Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead that Barclays committed any manipulative acts. As noted, a manipulative act is one that sends "a false pricing signal to the market" and therefore does not reflect the "natural interplay of supply and demand." ATSI, 493 F.3d at 100; see Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (observing that the term "‘manipulative' . . . connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities"). The SDNY Plaintiffs' do not allege any actions by Barclays that meet that definition. For example, one of the SDNY Plaintiffs' principal allegations is that Barclays overrode the Liquidity Profiling assessments of certain HFT firms. (SDNY Pls.' Mem. 14; SAC ¶ 277). But the SDNY Plaintiffs do not explain how such overrides themselves could have affected the price at which securities traded in the dark pool. The same goes for the allegations regarding co-location and information regarding the logic of the servers operating the dark pools. Although these actions may have made it easier for HFT firms to trade ahead of ordinary investors, the SDNY Plaintiffs do not explain how the actions themselves could have affected, much less artificially affected, the prices at which securities traded in the dark pool. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161.
Pages 30 -31 of the Opinion and Order
The Question for the Court
In granting the Defendants' motions to dismiss, Judge Furman admonishes that he will not be dragged into a public policy debate but has put on his judicial blinders and considered the case solely from the perspective of what the law provides. That's not always an easy task, particularly given the existence of so many activist courts, but to his credit, Furman appears to have stuck to his guns. As he noted:
Now pending are three motions by Defendants, largely pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the claims of Plaintiffs in all five cases (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Significantly, the motions do not call upon the Court to wade into the larger public debates regarding high-frequency trading or the fairness of the U.S. stock markets more generally. That is, Lewis's book may well highlight inequities in the structure of the Nation's financial system and the desirability for, or necessity of, reform. For the most part, however, those questions are not for the courts, but for commentators, private and semi-public entities (including the stock exchanges), and the political branches of government, which - as Plaintiffs themselves observe - have already taken up the issue. . . .
Page 2 of the Opinion and Order
Absolute Immunity
An interesting and important aspect of the Opinion and Order
is its discussion of the "absolute immunity" afforded to self-regulatory
organizations. As more fully set forth by Judge Furman:
B. Absolute Immunity
Next, the Exchanges argue that,
even if the Court has jurisdiction, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the
doctrine of absolute immunity. (See Exchanges' Mem. 24-36). It is well
established "that an SRO and its officers are entitled to absolute immunity
from private damages suits in connection with the discharge of their regulatory
responsibilities." Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 637 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting DL Capital Grp., 409
F.3d at 96). That is because the Exchanges "perform[] a variety of regulatory
functions that would, in other circumstances, be performed by the SEC - an
agency [that] is accorded sovereign immunity from all suits for money damages."
DL Capital Grp., 409 F.3d at 97. Thus, "in light of [the Exchanges'] special
status and connection to the SEC," they are, "out of fairness[,] . . . accorded
full immunity from suits for money damages" when taking action pursuant to this
special status. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
As in other contexts, absolute
immunity provides an SRO with "protection not only from liability, but also from
the burdens of litigation, including discovery, and should be ‘resolved at the
earliest possible stage in litigation.'" In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. &
Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 428, 448, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991), and citing other cases). The party
seeking that protection bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to
absolute immunity. See, e.g., D'Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93,
104 (2d Cir. 2001). Such immunity "is of a rare and exceptional character,"
Standard Inv. Chartered, 637 F.3d at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted),
and must therefore be evaluated on a caseby-case basis, see, e.g., DL Capital
Grp., 409 F.3d at 97, using a functional test that examines the "nature of the
function performed," Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988).
Specifically, an SRO "‘is entitled to immunity from suit when it engages in
conduct consistent with the quasigovernmental powers delegated to it pursuant
to the Exchange Act and the regulations and rules promulgated thereunder.'" DL
Capital Grp., 409 F.3d at 97 (quoting D'Alessio, 258 F.3d at 106). Or put
another way, "so long as the ‘alleged misconduct falls within the scope of the
quasi-governmental powers delegated to the [exchange],' absolute immunity
attaches." In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2007)
(quoting D'Alessio, 258 F.3d at 106).
Significantly, the motive or
reasonableness of the actions in question is irrelevant to the analysis. See,
e.g., id. at 95-96; accord Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998)
(holding that whether a government official is absolutely immune "turns on the
nature of the act, rather than on the [official's] motive or intent"). Instead,
"the decision to extend absolute immunity depends ‘upon the nature of the
governmental function being performed.'" DL Capital Grp., 409 F.3d at 99 n.4
(quoting D'Alessio, 258 F.3d at 104-05). Thus, the fact that the Exchanges in
this case are now for-profit corporations does not, by itself, deprive them of
absolute immunity. See, e.g., id.; cf. NYSE Specialists, 503 F.3d at 91 &
n.1 (holding that the defendant exchange was entitled to absolute immunity even
though it was "no longer a nonprofit corporation, following a merger which
commenced after the filing of [the] lawsuit"). For similar reasons, and as the
SDNY Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument (Tr. 33-34), it does not matter if an
Exchange, in performing a regulatory function, is also motivated by the desire
for profit or some other business purpose. Cf. Weissman v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that an SRO is not
protected by absolute immunity for actions that have no regulatory dimension
and relate solely to the SRO's business interests). Instead, the sole question
is whether the alleged misconduct falls within the scope of the
quasi-governmental powers delegated to the Exchanges - in which case absolute
immunity applies - or outside the scope of those powers - in which case it does
not. (See Exchanges' Reply Mem. 7 ("[A]bsolute immunity applies to SRO
activities that are incident to their regulatory functions, but not to
exclusively non-regulatory functions.")).
With those standards in mind, the
Court turns to the three practices of the Exchanges that the SDNY Plaintiffs
challenge in this case: co-location services, the proprietary data feeds, and
complex order types. (See SDNY Pls.' Mem. 7-11). Whether absolute immunity
applies to the provision of co-location services is easily answered. It does
not. Notably, although the Exchanges frame absolute immunity as a dispositive
defense with respect to all of the SDNY Plaintiffs' claims (see Exchanges' Mem.
29 (stating that "the Exchanges' immunity for proprietary feeds and co-location
is dispositive"), their memorandum of law does not actually seek to justify the
application of immunity to the provision of co-location services, let alone
support such a result. (See id. at 26-29). The Exchanges have thus abandoned
any argument for absolute immunity based on their provision of co-location
services. And, even if they had not, it is hard to see how the provision of
co-location services serves a regulatory function or differs from the provision
of commercial products and services that courts have held not to be protected
by absolute immunity in other cases. See, e.g., Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1298
(holding that an exchange was not absolutely immune for "tout[ing],
market[ing], advertis[ing] and promot[ing]" a particular equity because doing
so did not involve the "performance of regulatory, adjudicatory, or
prosecutorial duties" for which the SRO stood "in the stead of the SEC");
Facebook, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (denying absolute immunity with respect to an
exchange's design of software and promotion of its ability to facilitate an
initial public offering). The Exchanges, therefore, are not immune from suit
based on the provision of co-location services.
By contrast, the Exchanges are absolutely immune for their creation of complex order types. As noted, the order types permitted by an Exchange define the ways in which traders can interact with that Exchange. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-74032, 2015 WL 137640, at *2 ("Order types are the primary means by which market participants communicate their instructions for the handling of their orders to the exchange."). By establishing a defined set of order types, the Exchanges police the ways in which users of an exchange are able to interact with each other. See id. In so doing, the order types establish a framework by which buyers of stocks are matched with sellers. The creation of new order types - including complex ones - thus plainly "relates to the proper functioning of the regulatory system," for which the Exchanges enjoy absolute immunity. NYSE Specialists, 503 F.3d at 96 (quoting D'Alessio, 258 F.3d at 106); see also DL Capital Grp., 409 F.3d at 95 (stating that the "regulatory powers and responsibilities" that Congress delegated to stock exchanges include the duty "to develop, operate, and maintain" their markets, "to formulate regulatory policies and listing criteria" for the markets, "and to enforce those policies and rules, subject to the approval of . . . the SEC"). It is thus unsurprising that new or modified order types are among the Exchanges' rules that the SEC reviews under Exchange Act Section 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b), to ensure that they, among other things, prevent "fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices." See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-69419, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,449, 24,453 (Apr. 25, 2013); Exchange Act Release No. 34-63777, 76 Fed. Reg. 5630, 5634 (Feb. 1, 2011).
Pages 15 - 19 of the Opinion and Order
In finding that absolute immunity applies to the cited
conduct, Judge Furman explained that [Ed: footnote omitted]:
In sum, the Court concludes that
the Exchanges are absolutely immune from suit based on their creation of
complex order types and provision of proprietary data feeds, both of which fall
within the scope of the quasi-governmental powers delegated to the Exchanges.
That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the SEC has ample authority and
ability to regulate those activities and address any improprieties by the
Exchanges; the Second Circuit has instructed that a court evaluating a claim of
absolute immunity should "consider ‘whether there exist alternatives to damage
suits against the [the potentially immune entity] as a means of redressing wrongful
conduct' if absolute immunity applies." NYSE Specialists, 503 F.3d at 101
(quoting Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir. 1986)). Here, as
in NYSE Specialists, "[t]he alternatives [to a suit for damages] are manifold,"
with the principal alternative seeking to invoke the SEC's "formidable
oversight power to supervise, investigate, and discipline the [Exchanges] for
any possible wrongdoing or regulatory missteps.'" Id. The upshot - that the
SDNY Plaintiffs may not proceed with their claims with respect to the complex
order types and proprietary data feeds - "‘may be harsh,' but Congress
nevertheless saw fit to delegate to SROs certain regulatory powers for which
they ‘enjoy freedom from civil liability when they act[] in their regulatory capacity,'
even where the SROs ‘act in a capricious, even tartuffian manner which causes
enormous damage.'" Facebook, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (quoting Sparta Surgical
Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir.
1998)) (internal alterations omitted).
Page 23 of the Opinion and Order
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