For entities and individuals in a regulated industry,
there is often the sense that their regulators are hypocrites, who impose
unfair regulations. Such complaints are heard from virtually all those who are
subject to regulation, no matter the industry or the profession. In a sense,
this distrust is the inevitable byproduct of most regulatory systems, be it the
securities industry, the liquor business, power companies, the pharmaceutical
industry, etc.
Can anything be done to truly erase the
tension between the regulated and regulator -- and perhaps just as profound a
question: Aren't we best served when such tension exists? Alas, that is far too
difficult a topic to tackle here. That being said, those who regulate should at
least strive to maintain the integrity of the regulatory scheme and ensure that
they are not engaged in gotcha regulation. The perception of speed traps
on the regulatory highway is a troubling problem. The fine.
The suspension. The Bar. Those are the potent arrows in the
regulatory quiver. At times, however, it seems that the ability to inflict pain
is too quick a remedy for noncompliance. There are times when the reason for a
regulatory failure is inadvertent error or good-faith misunderstanding. There
are times, however, when the fault is negligence or intentional misconduct. I
do not pretend that it is an easy task do discern when misconduct is caused by
somewhat benign misadventure or bad intent. During my career as an industry
regulator, as an industry defense lawyer, and as a public customer lawyer, I
know that regulators often fail to provide
timely notice of noncompliance coupled with an opportunity to
cure any deficiencies. Not every misstep requires a fine, suspension, or Bar.
Similarly, effective regulation must impose a fine, suspension, or Bar when
warranted. There is a delicate balance between cultivating sound
regulatory/compliance practices versus punishing misconduct.
Let's face it, those
who regulate are human beings beset by the same human frailties as the rest of
us. Sometimes regulators drop the ball. Sometimes they are unfair. Sometimes
they are petty and vindictive. Among the worst conduct we see emanating from
any regulatory community arises when regulatory staff falls asleep on the job,
awakens to find that they have promoted deficient conduct by not timely
responding to red flags, and, as a result, fostered a protracted period of
misconduct during which the regulated entity or individual thought everything
was okay. When the slumbering regulator finally awakens and takes action,
tempers flare. Now you tell me? But we've done it this way for years
and you never said anything before? Consider today's BrokeAndBroker.com
Blog in which we are forced to wonder how long is too long for a
regulator and at what point was enough enough for a regulated
individual?Case In
Point For the purpose of proposing a settlement of rule
violations alleged by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
("FINRA"), without admitting or denying the findings, prior to a
regulatory hearing, and without an adjudication of any issue, Daryl Eugene
Allison submitted a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent ("AWC"),
which FINRA accepted. In the Matter of Daryl Eugene Allison Respondent
(AWC 2014039096601, December 19, 2016). (the "2016 AWC").
The AWC asserts that
Allison first entered the securities industry in 1970, and from June 1979 to
November 2015, he was registered with FINRA member firm Caprock Securities,
Inc., where he served during the times relevant to this AWC as that firm's
President and Chief Compliance Officer ("CCO"). The AWC asserts that
Caprock's FINRA membership was cancelled on November 10, 2015, due to its
failure to pay fees owed to FINRA.A Bit of
History As set forth in the AWC under the heading of
"RELEVANT DISCIPLINARY HISTORY," are the
following [Ed: "WSPs" are "Written Supervisory Procedures"]:
On November 7, 2011, FINRA issued
a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (No. 2009017068502) in which Allison
was fined $6,000 and suspended in a principal capacity for 10 business days for
violations of FINRA Rule 2010 and NASD Rules 2110 and 3010 by failing to
reasonably supervise two registered representatives, and failing to enforce
WSPs. On October 8, 2009, the Texas State Securities Board
("TSSB") (Case No. IC09-SUS-23) suspended Allison in all capacities
in the state of Texas for 21 days for: (1) failing to enforce WSPs; (2)
allowing a representative who was not registered in Texas to offer and sales
securities in Texas; (3) failing to timely provide information to TSSB staff;
(4) failing to disclosed required information on a registered representative's
Form U4; and (5) failing to maintain customer account statements.
On July 8, 1997, FINRA
issued a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (No. C06970013) in which
Allison was censured and fined $7,500 jointly and severally with a FINRA
member firm. Allison was also required to requalify by examination as a general
securities principal, and the member firm was required to retain an independent
consultant to review its deficient WSPs. Allison failed to enforce the member
firm's deficient WSPs. On June 9, 1988, FINRA accepted an Offer of
Settlement (Complaint No. TEX-589) in which Allison was censure [sic] and fined
$3,000 jointly and severally with a FINRA member firm for violations of
Sections 10(b) and 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") and Rules 10b-9 and 15c2-4 thereunder by failing to
return investor funds received in connection with a contingent securities
offering, when the offering failed to raise the minimum contingency amount.
Allison and the member firm also failed to properly escrow customer funds from
the offering.
Failure to Supervise
Reps and Enforce WSPs The 2016 AWC asserts
that during the relevant period from November 2012 to July 2014, Allison,
acting on behalf of Caprock, failed to supervise two registered
representatives's offers and sales of Closed-End Mutual Funds ("CEFs")
to nine customers. The 2016 AWC characterizes Allison's
alleged failure to supervise as ignoring or failing to detect numerous red
flags indicating "possibly unsuitable" CEF transactions. Also, the 2016 AWC
asserts that Allison failed to enforce Caprock's WSPs regarding the review of
exception reports to detect problematic trading activity in customer accounts. FINRA deemed
Allison's failure to supervise and to enforce WSPs as set forth above as
constituting violations of NASD Rule 3010(a) and (b) and FINRA Rule 2010. Branch InspectionsThe 2016
AWC alleges that during the relevant period from June 2011 to July
2014, Allison:
failed to conduct and/or to
adequately document inspections of Caprock's branch offices;
routinely inspected one of
Caprock's three branch offices, but failed to adequately document the
inspections; and
completely failed to conduct
inspections of two non-OSJ branch offices.
The 2016
AWC pejoratively describes Allison's inspection reports as:
mere
checklists that did not contained any information regarding testing and
verification of Caprock's policies and procedures and did not address all of the
areas required by NASD Rule 3010(c)(2) such as the validation of changes in
customer account information and customer address changes.
FINRA deemed
Allison's above-cited branch oversight as constituting violations of NASD Rule
3010(c) and FINRA Rule 2010.Recordkeeping
The 2016
AWC alleges
that during the relevant period from November 2012 to July 2014, Allison,
acting on behalf of Caprock, failed to establish and implement an adequate
supervisory system for the capture, review and/or retention of the firm's email
correspondence. As specified in the 2016 AWC, Allison allegedly failed to
ensure that Caprock:
maintained records to evidence
supervisory reviews of email correspondence,
captured, reviewed and retained
the email correspondence of registered representatives located in one of
Caprock's branch offices; and
accurately reflected the
registered representative of record on all customer account and transaction
records .
FINRA deemed the
above recordkeeping lapses by Allison as constituting violations of NASD Rules
3010(a), (b) and (d), NASD Rule 3110 (for conduct on or before December 4,
2011), FINRA Rule 4511 (for conduct on or after December 5, 2011) and FTNRA
Rule 2010.SanctionsIn
accordance with the terms of the 2016 AWC, FINRA imposed
upon Allison a $10,000 fine and a Bar from association with any FINRA member
firm in any Principal capacity.Bill Singer's
Comment Allison had some 46 years in the biz. What kind of
a record did he manage to put together during something shy of half a
century?
In 1988, FINRA (in the form of
its predecessor NASD) accepted an AWC from Allison pertaining to his alleged
failure to return investors funds and to properly escrow said funds in a
contingency offering;
In 1997, FINRA (again, the old
NASD) accepted another AWC in which Allison failed to enforce his firm's
deficient WSPs;
In 2009, Allison is suspended by the State of Texas
for yet again failing to enforce WSPs (although, this time a regulator did not
deem the WSPs as deficient, so there seems to have been some progress in the 12
years from 1997). Texas also complained that Allison was not disclosing
information on a U4; not maintaining customer account statements; and allowing
an unregistered rep "to offer and sales securities in Texas." To
offer and sales securities? Not
sure how you "sales securities" but that's the usage in the 2016
AWC, deficient as FINRA's grammar may be;
and
In 2011, FINRA accepts another AWC citing Allison
for failing to reasonably supervise two registered representatives, and failing
to enforce WSPs.
For purposes of
discussing the 2016 AWC, I'm giving Allison a freebie of
sorts with his 1988 AWC because it deals with a contingency offer and not
solely with WSPs or what I perceive to be issues solely involving the role of a
compliance officer. Let's just say it's that one free bite of the apple. Deficient
WSPsWhich brings me to 1997, when FINRA
characterizes the WSPs at Allison's firm as "deficient." As if what? These WSPs suddenly became deficient in 1997?
At what point from 1988 through FINRA's investigation did the WSP morph from
efficient to deficient? I raise this because given the full history of
Allison's alleged failure to maintain adequate WSPs, I find it more than a tad
hypocritical for a regulator to fail to discern the existence of deficient
WSPs at a member firm where that same self-regulator is supposed to be
conducting annual regulatory oversight and review. Seems to me that
if you're going to charge a member firm's WSP as being deficient then FINRA
should at least indicate the year when that status occurred. If FINRA's
investigative staff missed calling the alleged deficient state to a member
firm's attention for more than a year, that should be disclosed. Otherwise,
we're left to draw an uncomfortable inference that FINRA engages in gotcha regulation. Look
at it this way: If a member firm's WSPs are deficient for, say, three years and
FINRA conducted three annual on-site examinations that failed to raise the
purported deficiencies in the WSPs, why is it fair or appropriate to charge
that firm and/or its CCO with maintaining deficient WSPs? I'm not saying that
FINRA missed the metamorphosis of the WSPs at issue. What I am saying is that
FINRA should at least disclose how long it determined a given set of WSPs were
deficient so that it is clear that the self-regulator was not complicit in
failing to spot the shortcomings on a more timely basis and to put the member
firm and its CCO on notice.Relevant Disciplinary
HistoryFrom the four
events listed under "Relevant Disciplinary History" in the 2016
AWC, I can't imagine that too many regulators and compliance
professionals were too shocked to learn that Allison was again being charged
with WSP violations in 2016. Three of the four historical items make it clear
that Allison had a blind spot with WSP compliance. Which prompts you to wonder
what, if anything, FINRA staff did during its 2012, 2013, and 2014 member firm
examinations in order to ascertain whether Allison was WSP compliant. Without
coming off as too holier-than-thou, would you please allow
me to simply ask why Allison was even permitted to function as a CCO in 2016.
If you carefully read the allegations against Allison in the 2016 AWC,
you should note that his alleged misconduct purportedly occurred in
2012, 2013, and 2014, all of which post-dated the four items
in the Relevant Disciplinary History. The 2016 AWC characterizes
Allison's alleged failure to supervise as ignoring or failing to detect
numerous red flags indicating "possibly unsuitable" CEF transactions.
It would seem, in all fairness, that the same 2016 AWC also
presents FINRA's alleged failure to regulate because the self-regulatory organization
appears to have ignored or failed to detect numerous red flags indicating that
Allison was possibly unsuitable to serve as a member firm's
CCO.