Back in 2012, Mitt Romney was widely
derided for saying that "corporations are people too." Mitt's flat delivery made a fairly anodyne
comment politically toxic. Legally, corporations really are considered persons,
with most of the same rights as humans. And also, corporations are just a group
of people working together. Corporations are people all the way down.
And people think odd things. One of the
oddest is the question no dog has ever pondered: What is my purpose? A dog will
teach by example that one's only purpose is to experience existence to the
full. Our purpose is to pursue personal fulfillment.
Aristotle observed that humans cannot reach
fulfillment in isolation. To avoid a nasty, brutish and short life, we need to belong. We are political animals, he said; we are human only
to the extent that we live in a "polis," a community. According to Aristotle,
only an animal or a god, but no man, is an island.
Membership confers benefits, rights and
privileges. But the cost of membership is to foreswear some of our power to act
in the world, and to take on obligations that ensure the welfare of the
community as a whole, for the sake of our neighbors as well as ourselves. Those
obligations are mostly moral. A few of the more important are legally enforced,
but we could never enforce every single "ought." A good society is largely
self-policed.
All the people who compose a corporation
know this. But what of the corporation itself, if it too is a person? In the
corporate reform era of the early 20th Century, a number of thinkers converged
on the idea that if a corporation is conceptually a person separate from its
owners, then it too should assume the obligations of life in the polis, lest it
become an animal or a god. The most influential voice in explaining the role of
a modern corporation was Adolf Berle's.
In 1932, Berle and Gardiner Means
co-authored The Modern Corporation and Private Property. They demonstrated how
the wide dispersion of stockholders in modern corporations made the concept of
"ownership" meaningless. The modern corporation concentrates so much economic
power that it is comparable to the church in the Middle Ages or a state in the
modern era. A modern corporation "involves the interrelation of a wide
diversity of economic interests, -- those of the ‘owners' who supply capital,
those of workers who ‘create,' those of consumers who give value to the
products of the enterprise, and above all those of the control who wield
power." And with stockholders being so many, so diffuse and so transient, management
wielded "powers which are absolute and not limited by any implied obligation
with respect to their use." Their conclusions were radical: The passive
stockholders, by relinquishing effective control over management, surrendered
any claim that the corporation should serve their profit interests alone. As a
result, "They have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern
corporation serve not alone the owners or the control [that is, management] but
all society." That idea caught on and became a linchpin of New Deal corporate
regulation that remade corporate governance in the mid-20th Century.
All this was encapsulated in one of the
first corporate mission statements in 1943, by Robert Wood Johnson, whose
foundation today funds all sorts of PBS broadcasts, but who back then ran
Johnson & Johnson. Johnson wrote a
Credo. In it, he set out a list of obligations for his still-private
corporation, in four short paragraphs, in this order. First, to provide high
quality products to customers at a fair price; Second (by far the longest of
the four paragraphs), to ensure the "health and well-being" of its employees
(using language that could have come out of an Elizabeth Warren position
paper); Third, to support "the communities in which we live and work and to the
world community as well;" and fourth -- and most decidedly last -- to profit
the stockholders. To run it all, the Credo says, "We must provide highly
capable leaders and their actions must be just and ethical." In other words,
the professional manager, who came to called the Organization Man.
But in the 1970s, Milton Friedman and the
Chicago school of economics threw all that aside, and famously announced that
the sole purpose of a corporation was to generate profits for its shareholders
-- society, in effect, be damned. From the 80s on, short-term corporate profits
became the key test of good corporate citizenship. The Organization Man was
replaced by The Transaction Man, for whom everything is a deal and profit is
the only goal. See https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/10/01/transaction-man.
In elevating deal-making to an art, finance overwhelmed industry and we have
returned to robber baron days. CEO pay went from about 30 times the pay of the
median worker in 1975 to over 300 times today. The top 1% of the population
went from earning less than 10% of the country's total income to over 20%
today. See
https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality.
In their book Unequal Gains, Peter
Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson showed that 20% share of income to be a marker
-- that was the share of income that flowed to the 1% in Britain and America
before the Revolution, to the planters and merchants of the new Republic before
the Civil War, and to the great industrialists before the Depression. In each case, the 1%'s share got knocked down
to about 10%, and then rose again to 20%. In a democracy, it seems that's when
the 99% get fed up and hammer away at the 1%'s advantages -- 20% of income
seems to be when the torches and pitchforks come out.
No doubt sensing this, on August 19, the
Business Roundtable, comprising the leaders of America's largest corporations
adopted a new Statement of Purpose of a Corporation. https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
Read it after reading Johnson's Credo and you'll know where it came from. The
ordering obligations are all there: first, to customers; second, to employees;
third, to suppliers (Johnson included "business partners" among his first
point); fourth, to communities; and last, to shareholders.
The Business Roundtable drew a quick
rebuke -- like, within a few hours -- from the Council of Institutional
Investors. https://www.cii.org/aug19_brt_response. The Council represents
pension funds and other supposedly long-term shareholders, and their main beef
is that corporate management is simply trying to entrench itself. "If
‘stakeholder governance' and ‘sustainability' become hiding places for poor
management, or for stalling needed change, the economy more generally will lose
out."
Putting the Roundtable's Statement and
the Council's rebuttal next to one another, you can't help nodding "you're
right" to each in turn. But the Council lost me when it said this: "It is
government, not companies, that should shoulder the responsibility of defining
and addressing societal objectives with limited or no connection to long-term
shareholder value." John Dewy called statements like this "the philosopher's
fallacy," the tendency of academics to say abstract things that have no
relationship to the real world. Government should shoulder a responsibility?
When and in what galaxy?
I don't think so. We who would live in
decent communities should shoulder the responsibility to create them. And that
includes each of us who works through an organization, be it a roundtable, a
council, or a corporation. A person whose only goal is to make money is a
sociopath. The Council's response to the Roundtable is not entirely wrong, but
we need a better answer than to encourage corporate sociopaths. A corporation
that would be a man must be made to walk like one.
Aegis Frumento is a partner of Stern Tannenbaum &
Bell, and co-heads the firm's Financial Markets Practice. Mr. Frumento
represents persons and businesses in all aspects of commercial, corporate and
securities matters and dispute resolution (including trials and arbitrations);
SEC and FINRA regulated firms and persons on regulatory compliance issues and
in SEC and FINRA enforcement investigations and proceedings; and senior
executives of public corporations personal securities law and corporate
governance matters. Mr. Frumento also represents clients in
forming and registering broker-dealers and registered investment advisers, in
developing compliance policies, procedures and controls, and in adopting proper
disclosure documents. Those now include industry professionals looking to adapt
blockchain technologies to finance and financial market
enterprises.
Prior
to joining the firm, Mr. Frumento was a managing director of Citigroup and
Morgan Stanley, a partner and the head of the financial markets group of Duane
Morris LLP, and the managing partner of Singer Frumento
LLP.
He
graduated from Harvard College in 1976 and New York University School of Law in
1979. Mr. Frumento is a frequent author and speaker on securities law issues,
and is often quoted in the media on current securities law
developments.
NOTE: The views expressed in this Guest Blog are
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